Scum Liverpool fans..the real killers

[David Johnson]

First of all it is amusing to see you have thrown in the towel in about how it is just me distorting what you are saying. I suppose it is difficult to argue that when I copy and paste your posts. !laugh! !laugh!

"So yes: Of course the Liverpool fans all turned up nice and early, and were all quietly sipping from cans of Fanta while they formed orderly queues to get into the ground. None drank any alcohol, there was no pushing and shoving anywhere and they all had tickets. Every single one of them."

No matter how much you squirm, slime and slide to get out of it, you have stated that it was the Liverpool fans that CAUSED the deaths of 96 people, here. Not that they were ever so slightly to blame because of their pushing but that they CAUSED the deaths. That is what you state here.

"But when all's said and done, if there hadn't been so many fans without tickets causing a ruck at the back in the first place, the disaster would never have happened. Plenty of collective blame to go round on all sides".

Both the Taylor and the Independent Panel report CATEGORICALLY prove that this was not the case and if you had read either you would know that. Not that they both whitewashed it out of their reports but they CATEGORICALLY proved that you and your like are talking bollocks.

Carry on squirming, Eric. It's like watching an insect impaled on a pin.

[william]

This was a terrible incident and one that darkened british football. There were a whole number of contributing factors that led to this event and the aftermath as people who held office tried to distance and subvert the media. Of course our ever colourful sun took the establishment side and tried to pin the blame on the supporters - lets kick liverpool. dont forget the sun was a london paper with a heavy dislike of northerners.

The general hatred and trolling on this forum relating to this incident is pretty dispicable if you ask me, at least the government are standing up and acknowledging that they were in the wrong and that the establishment was guilty, thry could have stayed mute but they choose not to - hats off to them for this.

Now lets see this through - let the courts start the legal proceedings and let them get closure to this unfortunate incident. At least we can now work to put it behind us and pay our respects to the 96 that lost thier lives going to a football game. Thise are the ones that matter here, those are the ones that deserve our respect and sympathy.

Those that are hiding behind keyboards and trying to incite discord have shame on yourselves..................

[Flat_Eric]

Yeah and your performance in this thread has been as brilliant and incisive as ever David: Selectively quote and insult you opponents at every turn, throw in a pinch of sarcasm, stir in a whole heap of sanctimonious pompous-assery and add a laughing smiley for good measure.

And reading back through my own posts, I regret to having at times allowed myself to be sucked down to your level of vitriol.

William is quite right, this was a tragic case and if it's to be debated at all, it should be done with a bit of decorum on all sides.

So I'll just say one more time DJ: Read ALL of my posts again and not just the one line you keep repeating ad nauseum (you're like a broken record, and you fool no-one).

You obviously missed it last time, so I'll repeat my position:

(1) Police incompetent / lied / covered up. (2) Ground not fit for purpose. (3) Other systematic failures. (4) Fans' role in disaster possibly played down in Taylor report for purposes of political expediency. (5) Not convinced that "independent" inquiry was really fully independent. (6) Police and others found to have lied should be called to account. And if they're found guilty then the bastards should be locked up and as far as I'm concerned they can throw away the fucking key.

So you see - I really am not saying that the police were blameless, that they didn't fuck up royally and that they weren't criminal in lying and trying to deflect all the blame onto the fans.

But the idea that everyone's peddling now - that the all the Liverpool fans were blameless saints - is frankly fucking ridiculous.

Most of them were innocent and blameless. Those that died certainly were innocent and blameless. But the knobhead minority (ticketless or otherwise) were present and causing bother. There's plenty of anecdotal evidence to that effect from locals that Taylor **didn't** admit as evidence, as well as from many others present on the day. You can even see with your own eyes it on some of the CCTV footage.

So yes I do suspect that the two reports may have whitewashed the role of some elements of the Liverpool fans. It wouldn't be the first time that things have been whitewashed from official reports political / PR reasons. I can't prove it and you obviously don't agree with me (fair enough), but that is my suspicion.

Anyway, nothing that any of us say on here makes the blindest bit of difference. 96 innocent people died, and 96 families are still suffering because of it. Hopefully lessons have been learned. Grounds now are a lot safer and crowds are better controlled. Let's just hope it doesn't happen again.

This really is my last word in this thread now. I'm bowing out and I won't be back. Have a nice day.

- Eric

[David Johnson]

"Police incompetent / lied / covered up. (2) Ground not fit for purpose. (3) Other systematic failures. (4) Fans' role in disaster possibly played down in Taylor report for purposes of political expediency. (5) Not convinced that "independent" inquiry was really fully independent. (6) Police and others found to have lied should be called to account. And if they're found guilty then the bastards should be locked up and as far as I'm concerned they can throw away the fucking key."

"So you see - I really am not saying that the police were blameless, that they didn't fuck up royally and that they weren't criminal in lying and trying to deflect all the blame onto the fans."

No-one has suggested that you did say that the police were blameless.

You appear to be setting up statements that no-one has made about you in order to knock them down.

It does not matter what evasive tactic you use, your central view is as follows - the Liverpool fans caused the death of 96 individuals. And you made that statement, not retracted at any point by yourself in this thread.

"But when all's said and done, if there hadn't been so many fans without tickets causing a ruck at the back in the first place, the disaster would never have happened.

Do you wish to retract that statement given

1. YOu have given no evidence that it was "so many fans without tickets causing a ruck at the back" that caused the disaster..
2. The Taylor report disagrees with your view
3 The Independent Panel disagrees with your view.
4. The political parties disagree with your view.
5. The Hillsborough families disagree with your view.

If not, your other diversionary attempts to distract attention from your basic view that Liverpool fans were responsible for killing 96 people are irrelevant.

[David Johnson]

There are so many ignorant comments being made in this thread such as - the reports are a whitewash - it is political correctness - the Liverpool fans caused the disaster - from the usual people, I copy some points from the Independent Report produced earlier this week


Unheeded warnings - the seeds of disaster 1981 -89

1.In 1981 before the FA Cup Semi-Final between Tottenham Hotspur and
Wolverhampton Wanderers there was serious congestion at the Leppings Lane
turnstiles and crushing on the confined outer concourse. It resulted in the opening
of exit Gate C to relieve the crush. The disclosed documents indicate that entry into
the stadium was managed by South Yorkshire Police (SYP) officers on duty and
Sheffield Wednesday Football Club (SWFC) stewards.
2. What followed was a serious crush on the terraces in which many people were
injured and fatalities narrowly avoided. At that time lateral fences did not divide
the Leppings Lane terrace into pens, and fans were able to move sideways along
the full length of the terrace; others escaped onto the perimeter track through the
narrow gates in the perimeter fence.
3. The disclosed documents show that police officers located on the inner concourse,
between the turnstiles and the rear of the terrace, restricted access to the central
tunnel under the West Stand, diverting fans to the side access points to the terrace,
thus relieving pressure at the centre. Crowd density figures available to the Panel
demonstrate that the maximum capacity for the terrace was significantly exceeded.
4. The disclosed documents demonstrate that, following the 1981 incident, there was
a breakdown in the relationship between SWFC and SYP. SWFC refused to accept
the seriousness of the incident and held SYP responsible for the mismanagement
of the crowd. SYP considered that the maximum capacity for the Leppings Lane
terrace, set at 10,100, was too high, a view strongly contested by SWFC.
5. On the recommendation of SYP the construction of lateral fences in 1981 created
three pens, with movement between pens limited to a small gate at the head of
each lateral fence. According to SYP these gates were used to manage segregation
at league matches but were not ?stewarded? by the police.
6. From the earliest safety assessments made by safety engineers commissioned in
1978 by SWFC, it was apparent that the stadium failed to meet minimum standards
under the Safety of Sports Grounds Act 1975 and established in the Guide to Safety
at Sports Grounds (known as the ?Green Guide?), 1976. Documents released to the
Panel confirm that the local Advisory Group for Safety at Sports Grounds carried
out inadequate and poorly recorded inspections. There is clear evidence that
SWFC?s primary consideration was cost and, to an extent, this was shared by its
primary safety consultants, Eastwood & Partners.
Following the near tragedy in 1981, Hillsborough was not used for FA Cup semifinals
until 1987. During this period the Leppings Lane terrace underwent a series
of significant modifications and alterations, none of which led to a revised safety
certificate. The introduction of further lateral fences created two central pens
accessed via the tunnel beneath the West Stand. Recommendations to feed fans
directly from designated turnstiles into each pen, thus monitoring precisely the
distribution of fans between the pens, were not acted on because of anticipated
costs to SWFC.
8. Consequently, the turnstile counters were rendered irrelevant. Although they
provided a check on the overall numbers entering the terrace, there was no
information regarding crowd distribution between pens, each of which had an
established maximum capacity.
9. It is evident from the disclosed documents that SYP were preoccupied with
crowd management, segregation and regulation to prevent potential disorder.
SWFC?s primary concern was to limit costs. The Fire Service, however, raised
concerns about provision for emergency evacuation of the terraces. As the only
means of escaping forwards was onto the pitch, concern was raised specifically
about the width of the perimeter fence gates which was well below the standard
recommended by the Green Guide. The gradient of the tunnel under the West
Stand leading down onto the terrace also significantly breached the Green Guide?s
recommendation.
10. While modifications were made inside the stadium, the issue of congested access
to the turnstiles outside the stadium remained unresolved. As Lord Justice Taylor?s
Interim Report noted, of the stadium?s 54,000 capacity, over 24,000 fans were
channelled through 23 turnstiles feeding the North Stand, the West Stand and the
Leppings Lane terrace.
11. Following alterations, the safety of the existing maximum capacity for the Leppings
Lane terrace was questioned repeatedly yet the decision was taken by the Club and
the safety engineers not to revise the figure.
12. From the documents disclosed to the Panel, key issues ? positioning of safety
barriers, elevation of the tunnel, adequacy of the perimeter fence gates ? were not
discussed or recorded at the annual safety inspections. Following the delayed kickoff
at the 1987 FA Cup Semi-Final and the crushing at the 1988 FA Cup Semi-Final,
it is evident that debriefings held by all parties were inadequate. Crucial information
arising from these events was not shared within SYP, nor was it exchanged between
SYP and other agencies. There is no record provided by SWFC of debriefings held
between Club stewards and their managers. The Club denied knowledge of any
crowd-related concerns arising from the 1987 or 1988 FA Cup Semi-Finals.

[David Johnson]

The following summarising points from the Independent Panel report go on to list some of the reasons why although the authorities had narrowly avoided disaster a number of times previously at Leppings Lane, in 1989, disaster struck.

An absolutely critical mistake was to put someone in charge, Duckenfield a man with minimal experience in crowd control at Hillsborough only 3 weeks before the match.

1.The SYP decision to replace the experienced match commander, Chief
Superintendent Brian Mole, and appoint Chief Superintendent David Duckenfield
who had minimal experience of policing at Hillsborough, just weeks before an FA
Cup semi-final, has been previously criticised. None of the documents disclosed to
the Panel indicated the rationale behind this decision.
14. A planning meeting attended by both senior officers was held less than a month
before the match. The documents disclosed to the Panel give no explanation for
the non-attendance of the South Yorkshire Metropolitan Ambulance Service and the
Fire Service at this meeting.
15. Chief Superintendent Duckenfield held a briefing for senior officers on the day
before the match. At that meeting he emphasised the importance of crowd safety.
Briefings held by other senior officers, however, focused on potential crowd
disorder, alcohol consumption, ticketless fans and the difficulties of managing
Liverpool supporters. From the documents disclosed to the Panel, it is apparent
that the collective policing mindset prioritised crowd control over crowd safety.
16. This mindset, directed particularly towards Liverpool fans, was clearly evident in
SYP?s submission to the Taylor Inquiry.
17. As previously known, the SYP 1989 Operational Order was derived, with a few
alterations, from the 1988 Order and gave no indication of the crowd management
problems experienced in 1988.
18. The SYP Operational Order concentrated primarily on the control and regulation of
the crowd with no appropriate reference to crowd safety, crushing or evacuation of
the stands/terraces.
19. From the documents disclosed to the Panel, the management roles and
responsibilities of senior SYP officers were unclear, particularly the lines of
communication, decision-making and information exchange between those
responsible for policing outside the stadium and the ground commander inside the
stadium.
20. There was clear evidence in the build-up to the match, both inside and outside
the stadium, that turnstiles serving the Leppings Lane terrace could not process
the required number of fans in time for the kick-off. Yet the growing danger was
ignored. When the request to delay the kick-off eventually was made, it was
considered too late as the teams were on the pitch.
21. For a considerable period inside the Police Control Box it was clear from the
near view of the central pens below, and the CCTV coverage of the turnstiles
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and pens, that serious problems of overcrowding were occurring at the turnstiles
and in the pens. Senior police officers? decision-making was hampered by poor
communications, a malfunctioning radio system and the design of the Control Box.
22. Superintendent Roger Marshall was responsible for policing outside the stadium at
the Leppings Lane end. As the crush at the turnstiles became severe he requested
the opening of exit gates to allow fans into the stadium and relieve crowd pressure.
He had no knowledge of the uneven distribution of fans on the Leppings Lane
terrace. Similarly, the ground commander inside the stadium, Chief Superintendent
Roger Greenwood, had no knowledge of the extreme situation developing outside
the stadium.
23. The overview of both sites was the Control Box, with CCTV monitors and a
near view of the central pens. Chief Superintendent Duckenfield acceded to
Superintendent Marshall?s request and authorised the opening of Gate C. Despite a
clear view from the Control Box and CCTV monitors, neither Chief Superintendent
Duckenfield nor his assistant, the experienced Superintendent Bernard Murray,
anticipated the impact on the already packed central pens of fans descending the
tunnel directly opposite Gate C.
24. On opening Gate C there was no instruction given to the SYP officers inside the
stadium to manage the flow and direction of the incoming crowd.
25. From the documents provided to the Panel it is clear that the crush at the Leppings
Lane turnstiles outside the stadium was not caused by fans arriving ?late? for the
kick-off. The turnstiles were inadequate to process the crowd safely, and the rate of
entry insufficient to prevent a dangerous build-up of people outside the ground.

[David Johnson]

So given the Leppings Lane situation was a disaster waiting to happen as described in the post "An accident waiting to happen" what compounded the risk in 89 was that police custom and practice which had evolved in response to crowd
management issues unique to FA Cup semi-finals were thrown out of the window, particularly filtering access to the
concourse through ticket-checking on the approaches, directing incoming spectators away
from the central pens when they were estimated to be near capacity, and closing the tunnel
when capacity was estimated to have been reached. None of these practices appear to have been recorded and none formed part of the
Operational Order or the police briefings before the 1989 Semi-Final.

I would draw the attention of Flat Eric in particular to points 27, 28 and 37 which explain why a crush occurred. Nothing to do with "ticketless, Liverpool fans having a ruck at the back.

Based on the established policy of maintaining segregation of fans within the
stadium and its approaches, particularly at FA Cup semi-finals, the documents
disclosed to the Panel demonstrate that SYP determined the allocation of the
stadium?s stands and terraces to each club?s fans. The tickets allocated to
Nottingham Forest fans significantly exceeded those allocated to Liverpool fans,
an issue raised by Liverpool Football Club and the Football Association.
27. The confined outer concourse area serving the Leppings Lane turnstiles
accommodated the entire Liverpool crowd, heading towards three discrete areas
within the stadium (North Stand; West Stand; Leppings Lane terrace). It was a
well-documented bottleneck and at matches with capacity attendance presented
a predictable and foreseeable risk of crushing and injury.
28. From statements provided to the Panel, at previous FA Cup semi-finals SYP
managed congestion in the outer concourse area and its approaches by filtering the
crowd and checking tickets on the roads leading to the ground. This did not happen
in 1989. The former SYP match commander, Chief Superintendent Brian Mole,
denied that filtering the crowd?s approach to the turnstiles had been previously
adopted as police practice.
29. SYP proposed that preventing ticketless fans from approaching the turnstiles was
not possible because no offence had been committed. This was contested and
criticised by Counsel to the Taylor Inquiry.
30. In their 1989 statements some SYP officers referred to crushing in the outer
concourse area at the 1988 FA Cup Semi-Final. They were asked by the SYP
solicitors, Hammond Suddards, to reconsider and qualify their statements.
31. Concerning the distribution of the crowd on the standing terraces inside the
stadium, Chief Superintendent Mole stated that officers on the perimeter track and
in the Control Box estimated when full capacity of each pen was reached ?based on
experience?.
32. SYP officers with extensive experience of policing Hillsborough, including Chief
Superintendent Mole, stated that the fans? distribution between the Leppings Lane
terrace pens was based on an informal practice that allowed fans to ?find their own
level?. In the aftermath of the 1989 disaster, SYP claimed that ?find their own level?
was a flawed practice ?devised? by the safety engineers and SWFC.
33. From the SYP statements disclosed to the Panel it is evident that SWFC stewards
and SYP officers with experience of managing the crowd on the Leppings Lane
terrace had adopted the practice of redirecting fans to side pens when the central
pens were estimated to be full. At semi-final matches in 1987 and in 1988 the
gates at the entrance to the tunnel opposite the turnstiles and leading into the
central pens were closed temporarily by police officers who redirected fans to the
side pens. In 1988 many fans in the central pens experienced crushing and minor
injuries. Neither the gate closures nor the crushing were recorded in debriefing
notes.
34. Although an established practice, the use of the tunnel entrance gates as a means
of regulating access to the central pens was not included in the Operational Order
for capacity crowd matches.
11
35. The disclosed documents reveal persistent ambiguity throughout the 1980s about
SYP?s and SWFC?s responsibilities for crowd management. The SYP position,
exemplified by Chief Superintendent Mole?s statements, was that while safety was a
concern for SYP the ?prevention of hooliganism? and ?public disorder? was the main
priority. The custom and practice that had evolved within SYP for packing the pens
was concerned primarily with controlling the crowd.
36. In the view of Chief Superintendent Mole?s successor, Chief Superintendent David
Duckenfield, crowd distribution between the Leppings Lane terrace pens was
the responsibility of SWFC stewards but police officers, particularly those on the
perimeter track, were expected to react to overcrowding in the pens.
37. In its post-disaster assessment the West Midlands Police investigators concluded
that the failure to anticipate that unregulated entry of fans through exit Gate C and
down the tunnel would lead to a sustained crush in already full central pens had a
?direct bearing on the disaster?.
38. SYP officers with experience of the inner concourse and terrace access stated
that previously they had controlled access to the tunnel once the central pens
appeared to be full, particularly in 1988. The disclosed documents reveal that this
information was deleted from some officers? statements. Several officers declined
a further invitation by SYP solicitors to reconsider their statements regarding SYP
responsibility for monitoring the pens.
39. Senior SYP officers denied knowledge of tunnel closures at previous semi-finals,
particularly 1988. They placed responsibility for that information not being given at
debriefings on the officers responsible for the closures. Yet SYP officers responsible
for closing the tunnel access in 1988 claimed that they had acted under instructions
from senior officers.
40. Whatever their personal knowledge of the 1988 tunnel closure, both Chief
Superintendent Mole and Chief Superintendent Duckenfield admitted their
awareness of the practice of occasionally restricting access to the tunnel to prevent
overcrowding in the central pens.